In 2023, prior to the events of October 7, Jewish New Yorkers felt strongly attached to Israel, more so than Jewish Americans as a whole. They widely supported Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and believed that caring about Israel was essential to their Jewish identity.
Within the Jewish community in the eight-county area, however, certain groups felt notably more or less attached to Israel. The Orthodox community reported high levels of attachment to Israel, as did Jews who identified as Conservative and Reform. Politically conservative and older Jews (50 and over) also reported higher levels of attachment to Israel, while politically liberal and younger Jews (49 and below) reported lower levels of attachment.
When reflecting on how their attachment to Israel has changed over the past decade, Jewish adults mostly report that their attachment to Israel has stayed the same. The notable exception to this is non-Orthodox adults under the age of 30. Almost 40% of this group report that their attachment to Israel has weakened over the past decade.
In 2023, most Jewish adults in the New York area were emotionally attached to Israel: Overall, 64% reported being either very attached or somewhat attached to Israel. When compared with all American Jews, New York Jews reported higher levels of attachment to Israel than the national average (58%).1 Jewish adults’ levels of emotional attachment to Israel significantly varies by denomination, age, extent to which being Jewish is important to them, and political affiliation.2
| Attachment to Israel | 2020 US | 2023 NY |
|---|---|---|
| Not at all attached | 14% | 17% |
| Not very attached | 27% | 19% |
| Somewhat attached | 33% | 33% |
| Very attached | 26% | 31% |
There is an association between age and Israel attachment, with younger adults reporting the lowest levels of attachment and older adults reporting the highest levels. Seventy-two percent of adults aged 65 or older reported feeling at least somewhat attached to Israel, compared with 56% of adults ages 18 – 29. Younger adults also have the lowest rates of attachment, with 44% of Jewish adults under 30 stating they feel either not very or not at all attached to Israel.
| Attachment to Israel | 18-29 | 30-49 | 50-64 | 65+ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not at all attached | 25% | 22% | 13% | 13% |
| Not very attached | 19% | 23% | 21% | 15% |
| Somewhat attached | 32% | 28% | 36% | 38% |
| Very attached | 24% | 27% | 30% | 34% |
Orthodox adults report the highest levels of attachment to Israel, with 86% feeling somewhat or very attached, followed by Conservative Jewish adults (80%), Reform Jewish adults (62%), and Jewish adults of no or some other denomination (46%).
| Attachment to Israel | Orthodox | Conservative | Reform | Nondenominational/Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not at all attached | 7% | 8% | 12% | 29% |
| Not very attached | 7% | 11% | 26% | 25% |
| Somewhat attached | 23% | 39% | 43% | 32% |
| Very attached | 63% | 41% | 19% | 14% |
Attachment to Israel significantly varies by the extent to which Jewish adults report that being Jewish is important to them. Among those who report that being Jewish is important to them “a great deal,” 85% report being at least somewhat attached to Israel, compared with 19% of those who report that being Jewish is “not at all” important to them.
| Being Jewish Is Important to Me | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Attachment to Israel | Not at All | Not Much | Some | A Great Deal |
| Not at all attached | 73% | 56% | 16% | 4% |
| Not very attached | 8% | 20% | 32% | 11% |
| Somewhat attached | 13% | 20% | 44% | 36% |
| Very attached | 6% | 4% | 9% | 49% |
Political affiliation also shapes Jewish attachments to Israel. About half of politically liberal Jews feel at least somewhat connected to Israel, while 70% of politically moderate Jews and 81% of politically conservative Jews feel attached to Israel.
| Liberal | Moderate | Conservative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not at all attached | 23% | 16% | 9% |
| Not very attached | 27% | 15% | 10% |
| Somewhat attached | 34% | 36% | 30% |
| Very attached | 16% | 34% | 51% |
While attitudes toward Israel vary among subgroups within the Jewish community, those who report low and high levels of attachment to Israel can also be thought of as two distinct groups unto themselves: the Israel-distant and the Israel-attached. The Israel-distant comprises those Jewish adults who report feeling “not at all” or “not very” attached to Israel while the Israel-attached are those Jewish adults who report feeling “somewhat” or “very” attached to Israel. This sidebar explores the characteristics of these two groups and how they differ along the areas of denomination, age, importance of being Jewish, and political affiliation.
| Attachment to Israel by Denomination | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Israel-Distant | Israel-Attached | All NY Jewish Adults | |
| Orthodox | 9% | 31% | 23% |
| Conservative | 8% | 19% | 15% |
| Reform | 20% | 19% | 19% |
| Nondenominational/Other | 63% | 30% | 43% |
| TOTAL | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Among those who are Israel-distant, the majority (63%) are nondenominational or other. In contrast, the majority (69%) of the Israel-attached are denominationally identified Jewish adults, and nearly a third are Orthodox. It is important to note, however, that 37% of the Israel-distant identify with a denomination, and that 30% of the Israel-attached do not identify denominationally.
| Attachment to Israel, by Age Categories | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Israel-Distant | Israel-Attached | All NY Jewish Adults | |
| 18–29 | 21% | 16% | 18% |
| 30–49 | 35% | 25% | 29% |
| 50–64 | 21% | 24% | 23% |
| 65+ | 23% | 35% | 30% |
| TOTAL | 100% | 100% | 100% |
The Israel-distant are, overall, a younger group than the Israel-attached. Over half of people who are Israel-distant are under 50, compared with 41% of those who are Israel-attached. Additionally, about 35% of the Israel-attached are over the age of 65, while only 23% of the Israel-distant are in that same age cohort.
| Attachment to Israel, by Age Categories (Excluding Orthodox) | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Israel-Distant | Israel-Attached | All NY Jewish Adults | |
| 18–29 | 19% | 11% | 14% |
| 30–49 | 35% | 22% | 28% |
| 50–64 | 21% | 26% | 24% |
| 65+ | 25% | 41% | 34% |
| TOTAL | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Among the non-Orthodox, the age differences between the Israel-attached and Israel-distant widen further, as many of the younger adults attached to Israel are Orthodox. Two-thirds of non-Orthodox adults who are Israel-attached are 50 and over, and only one-third are under 50.
| Attachment to Israel, by Political Affiliation | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Israel-Distant | Israel-Attached | All NY Jewish Adults | |
| Liberal | 62% | 35% | 45% |
| Moderate | 25% | 33% | 30% |
| Conservative | 13% | 32% | 25% |
| TOTAL | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Jewish adults who are Israel-distant are largely liberal, although a quarter of this group identifies politically as moderate. Only 13% of the Israel-distant are politically conservative. In contrast, the Israel-attached group is distributed roughly equally between those who are liberal, moderate, and conservative.
| Attachment to Israel, by Being Jewish Important | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Israel-Distant | Israel-Attached | All NY Jewish Adults | |
| Being Jewish Is Not Important | 34% | 5% | 16% |
| Being Jewish Is Important | 66% | 95% | 84% |
| TOTAL | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Among the Israel-attached, 95% report that being Jewish is important to them. Among the Israel-distant, only 66% report that being Jewish is important to them (either somewhat or very).
In 2023, the majority of Jewish adults reported that their emotional attachment to Israel has remained the same compared with 10 years ago. About one in five Jewish adults (21%) reported that their attachment became stronger, and about one in six (16%) reported that their attachment had weakened compared with 10 years ago. Perceived change in attachment to Israel is associated with denomination, extent to which being Jewish is important, and political affiliation.
| Attachment to Israel Today Compared With 10 Years Ago | 2023 |
|---|---|
| Became weaker | 16% |
| Stayed the same | 63% |
| Became stronger | 21% |
| Total | 100% |
Among individuals whose connection to Israel has weakened over the past decade, most now consider themselves not at all or not very attached, though 38% continue to feel somewhat or very attached to Israel in 2023. Those whose attachment has remained stable are found across all levels of connection, with the largest share identifying as somewhat attached. Meanwhile, those whose attachment has strengthened are predominantly very attached to Israel, although 30% identify as somewhat attached.
| Attachment to Israel | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not at All | Not Very | Somewhat | Very | Total | |
| Became weaker | 31% | 30% | 29% | 9% | 100% |
| Stayed the same | 19% | 20% | 35% | 26% | 100% |
| Became stronger | 1% | 6% | 30% | 63% | 100% |
Orthodox and Conservative Jewish adults are more likely to report that their attachment to Israel has increased over the past decade. Conversely, Reform and nondenominational or other Jewish adults are more likely to report a weakening rather than strengthening attachment over the past 10 years. Nearly 40% of Orthodox Jews and about a quarter (24%) of Conservative Jews report that their attachment to Israel has increased over the past decade.
| Orthodox | Conservative | Reform | Nondenominational/Other | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Became weaker | 6% | 14% | 19% | 20% |
| Stayed the same | 55% | 62% | 66% | 68% |
| Became stronger | 39% | 24% | 15% | 12% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Perceived change in emotional attachment to Israel is significantly associated with the extent to which individuals feel that being Jewish is important to them. About 28% of Jewish adults who reported that being Jewish is important to them “a great deal” indicate that their attachment to Israel had become stronger in the past 10 years, compared with 3% of those who reported that being Jewish was “not at all” important to them.
| Being Jewish Is Important to Me | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not at All | Not Much | Some | A Great Deal | |
| Became weaker | 17% | 25% | 21% | 11% |
| Stayed the same | 80% | 74% | 67% | 61% |
| Became stronger | 3% | 2% | 12% | 28% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Political affiliation is also associated with Jewish adults’ perceived change in their attachment to Israel. Thirty-seven percent of politically conservative Jewish adults report that their attachment to Israel has increased over the past 10 years, compared with 21% of moderates and 11% of liberals. Moreover, liberal Jewish adults more frequently report that their attachment to Israel has weakened compared with 10 years ago, with 27% reporting weakening attachment compared with 9% of moderates and only 4% of conservatives.
| Liberal | Moderate | Conservative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Became weaker | 27% | 9% | 4% |
| Stayed the same | 62% | 69% | 59% |
| Became stronger | 11% | 21% | 37% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% as respondents could offer multiple reasons.
Those who report decreased attachment to Israel over the past 10 years cite the conflict with the Palestinians (32%) and concern about the Israeli government and political system (56%) as the two leading reasons for their weakening attachment to Israel.
| Among Those Who Became Less Attached | |
|---|---|
| Reason for Change | % |
| Government / Politics / Netanyahu | 56% |
| Conflict / Treatment of Palestinians | 32% |
| Orthodox control / Religious discrimination | 4% |
| Visiting / Learning more | 3% |
| Growing older / Different life stage | 3% |
| Other | 18% |
Those who report increased attachment to Israel over the past 10 years most frequently cite visiting and/or learning more about Israel as the leading reason for their strengthening attachment to it. Notably, visiting or learning more about Israel is cited among both people who have become more and less attached, but it represents a significantly greater share of reasons for strengthened attachment (31%) compared with weakened attachment (3%). Other top reasons for strengthened attachment include relationships with family or friends in Israel (12%).
| Among Those Who Became More Attached | |
|---|---|
| Reason for Change | % |
| Visiting / Learning more | 31% |
| Friends / Family / Relationship | 12% |
| Growing older / Different life stage | 11% |
| Global antisemitism | 7% |
| Connecting to Jewish identity / Community / Practice | 5% |
| Security threats / Terrorism | 5% |
| Criticism of Israel / Anti-Zionism | 4% |
| Other | 29% |
The majority of Jewish adults at least somewhat agreed that caring about Israel was an essential part of their Jewish identity in 2023. The extent to which Jewish adults reported that caring about Israel is an essential part of their Jewish identity significantly varies by age, denomination, extent to which being Jewish is important to them, and political affiliation.
| Level of Agreement | 2023 |
|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 17% |
| Somewhat disagree | 12% |
| Somewhat agree | 32% |
| Strongly agree | 39% |
Overall, over 70% of Jewish adults at least somewhat agree that caring about Israel is an essential part of their Jewish identity. However, older Jewish adults more frequently report that caring about Israel is an essential part of their Jewish identity. Nearly 80% of Jewish adults aged 65 and older at least somewhat agree with the statement that caring about Israel is an essential part of their Jewish identity, compared with 64% of Jewish adults aged 30-49 and just 54% aged 18-29.
| 18–29 | 30–49 | 50–64 | 65+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 32% | 20% | 12% | 11% |
| Somewhat disagree | 14% | 16% | 9% | 10% |
| Somewhat agree | 27% | 30% | 36% | 35% |
| Strongly agree | 27% | 34% | 43% | 44% |
The extent to which Jewish adults agree that caring about Israel is an essential part of their Jewish identity is patterned by their denominational affiliation. Sixty-five percent of Orthodox adults strongly agree with this sentiment compared with 49% of Conservative Jewish adults, 35% of Reform Jewish adults, and 23% of nondenominational or other denomination Jewish adults.
| Orthodox | Conservative | Reform | Nondenominational/Other | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 13% | 9% | 12% | 25% |
| Somewhat disagree | 6% | 6% | 13% | 17% |
| Somewhat agree | 17% | 37% | 40% | 34% |
| Strongly agree | 65% | 49% | 35% | 23% |
Politically conservative Jewish adults most frequently report that caring about Israel is an essential part of their Jewish identity. Eighty-five percent of politically conservative Jewish adults at least somewhat agree with the statement that caring about Israel is an essential part of their Jewish identity, compared with 80% of moderates and 57% of liberal Jewish adults.
| Liberal | Moderate | Conservative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 25% | 11% | 10% |
| Somewhat disagree | 18% | 9% | 5% |
| Somewhat agree | 34% | 35% | 25% |
| Strongly agree | 23% | 45% | 60% |
Jewish New Yorkers overwhelmingly support Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state: Eighty-seven percent of all Jewish adults in the eight-county area affirm this statement. The extent to which Jewish adults agree or disagree that Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state significantly varies by age, denomination, and political affiliation.
| Level of Agreement | 2023 |
|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 8% |
| Somewhat disagree | 5% |
| Somewhat agree | 16% |
| Strongly agree | 71% |
In 2023, the belief that Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state is meaningfully patterned by age. Adults over 50 almost universally (94%) agree that Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state compared with 86% of adults aged 30–49 and 65% of Jewish adults aged 18–29 who believe so.
| 18–29 | 30–49 | 50–64 | 65+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 21% | 8% | 5% | 4% |
| Somewhat disagree | 13% | 6% | 2% | 2% |
| Somewhat agree | 26% | 20% | 13% | 9% |
| Strongly agree | 39% | 66% | 81% | 85% |
Given that Haredi status is linked to both age and belief in Israel’s right to exist, it is important to look at age patterns excluding Haredi respondents to fully understand the impact of age on these views. Among non-Haredi respondents only, support for Israel’s right to exist still declines among those under age 50, but by slightly smaller margins: 88% of non-Haredi adults ages 30–49 and 73% of those ages 18–29 agree, compared with 94% among those 50 and older.
| 18–29 | 30–49 | 50–64 | 65+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 13% | 6% | 4% | 4% |
| Somewhat disagree | 14% | 6% | 2% | 2% |
| Somewhat agree | 31% | 23% | 13% | 10% |
| Strongly agree | 42% | 65% | 81% | 84% |
Nearly all Reform (96%) and Conservative (94%) Jewish adults agree that Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish state, compared with 84% of Jewish adults from other or no denominations. In contrast, Orthodox Jewish adults show the lowest level of agreement, with only 80% affirming Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. This lower level of support among Orthodox Jews is largely driven by anti-Zionist Haredi groups within the Orthodox community.
| Orthodox | Conservative | Reform | Non-Denominational/Other | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 16% | 2% | 3% | 9% |
| Somewhat disagree | 3% | 3% | 2% | 7% |
| Somewhat agree | 6% | 7% | 18% | 24% |
| Strongly agree | 74% | 88% | 78% | 60% |
Politically moderate Jewish adults most frequently agree that Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state, at 92%, compared with 87% of conservatives and 85% of liberals. The extent to which Jewish adults strongly agree that Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state varies more widely by political affiliation, with 62% of liberal Jewish adults strongly agreeing with this view compared with 78% of moderates and 80% of conservatives.
| Liberal | Moderate | Conservative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 7% | 7% | 11% |
| Somewhat disagree | 8% | 2% | 2% |
| Somewhat agree | 23% | 14% | 7% |
| Strongly agree | 62% | 78% | 80% |
In 2023, 66% of Jewish adults in the eight-county area report following news regarding Israel at least somewhat closely, with one in in four Jewish adults (25%) reporting following news very closely. The degree to which Jewish adults report following news regarding Israel in 2023 varies significantly by age, denomination, and extent to which being Jewish is important to them.
| 2023 | |
|---|---|
| Not at all | 7% |
| Not too closely | 27% |
| Somewhat closely | 41% |
| Very closely | 25% |
The extent to which Jewish adults follow news regarding Israel increases with age. In 2023, nearly one-third (32%) of Jewish adults aged 65+ report following news regarding Israel very closely, compared with 27% of those age 50–64, 18% of those 30–49–, and 14% of those aged 18–29.
| 18–29 | 30–49 | 50–64 | 65+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not at all | 16% | 8% | 4% | 3% |
| Not too closely | 36% | 36% | 26% | 18% |
| Somewhat closely | 34% | 39% | 43% | 46% |
| Very closely | 14% | 18% | 27% | 32% |
How closely Jewish adults follow news regarding Israel also varies by denomination. About 42% of Orthodox Jewish adults report following news regarding Israel very closely in 2023, compared with 30% of Conservative Jewish adults, 21% of Reform Jewish adults, and 15% of nondenominational or other denomination Jewish adults.
| Orthodox | Conservative | Reform | Nondenominational/Other | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not at all | 7% | 3% | 4% | 10% |
| Not too closely | 17% | 20% | 34% | 33% |
| Somewhat closely | 34% | 47% | 41% | 42% |
| Very closely | 42% | 30% | 21% | 15% |
Following news regarding Israel is positively associated with the extent to which Jewish adults report that being Jewish is important to them. Among Jewish adults who report that being Jewish is important to them “a great deal,” about 83% report following news regarding Israel at least somewhat closely, compared with only 34% among those who indicate that being Jewish is “not at all” important to them.
| Being Jewish Is Important to Me | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not at All | Not Much | Some | A Great Deal | |
| Not at all | 35% | 14% | 6% | 1% |
| Not too closely | 31% | 48% | 36% | 16% |
| Somewhat closely | 23% | 29% | 46% | 44% |
| Very closely | 11% | 9% | 12% | 39% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
In 2023, about half of Jewish adults in the eight-county area reported feeling very comfortable expressing their views regarding Israel in Jewish spaces, yet Jewish adults reported less comfort expressing their views about Israel in non-Jewish spaces. Most Jewish adults report that their comfort expressing their views on Israel generally has not changed, but among those for whom it has, more Jews have become less comfortable than more comfortable.
The majority of Jewish adults feel comfortable expressing their views about Israel in both Jewish and non-Jewish spaces; however, more Jewish adults reported feeling somewhat or very comfortable expressing their views about Israel in Jewish spaces (80%) than in non-Jewish spaces (65%). In 2023, about one in three Jewish adults (35%) reported feeling somewhat or very uncomfortable sharing their views about Israel in non-Jewish spaces.
| Jewish Spaces | Non-Jewish Spaces | |
|---|---|---|
| Very uncomfortable | 7% | 10% |
| Somewhat uncomfortable | 13% | 25% |
| Somewhat comfortable | 28% | 39% |
| Very comfortable | 52% | 26% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
Specifically, Jewish adults who are less emotionally attached to Israel feel less comfortable sharing their views on Israel in Jewish settings: Thirty-five percent of those who are not very attached and 46% of those who are not at all attached feel uncomfortable sharing these views in Jewish settings. With respect to non-Jewish spaces, there is no significant association between emotional attachment to Israel and comfort sharing views about Israel.
| Attachment to Israel | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Comfort in Jewish Spaces | Not at All | Not Very | Somewhat | Very |
| Very uncomfortable | 21% | 7% | 3% | 4% |
| Somewhat uncomfortable | 25% | 28% | 8% | 3% |
| Somewhat comfortable | 28% | 40% | 32% | 15% |
| Very comfortable | 26% | 24% | 56% | 78% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Attachment to Israel | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Comfort in Non-Jewish Spaces | Not at All | Not Very | Somewhat | Very |
| Very uncomfortable | 14% | 9% | 8% | 10% |
| Somewhat uncomfortable | 23% | 33% | 22% | 24% |
| Somewhat comfortable | 37% | 43% | 42% | 33% |
| Very comfortable | 26% | 14% | 27% | 32% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
With respect to demographics, comfort expressing views in Jewish spaces is significantly associated with age, denomination, extent to which being Jewish is important, and political affiliation. Comfort expressing views in non-Jewish spaces is only significantly associated with age, with older Jewish adults reporting higher levels of comfort expressing their views in non-Jewish spaces than younger Jewish adults.
In general, older Jewish adults feel more comfortable expressing their views on Israel in Jewish spaces compared with younger Jews. The overwhelming majority of Jewish adults ages 50–64 and ages 65 and older feel comfortable expressing their views (84% and 86%, respectively), compared with 77% of those ages 30–49 and 67% of those ages 18–29. One-third of the youngest adults report feeling uncomfortable expressing their views on Israel in Jewish spaces.
| Comfort in Jewish Spaces | 18–29 | 30–49 | 50–64 | 65+ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Very uncomfortable | 10% | 8% | 7% | 4% |
| Somewhat uncomfortable | 22% | 15% | 9% | 10% |
| Somewhat comfortable | 22% | 31% | 27% | 31% |
| Very comfortable | 45% | 46% | 57% | 55% |
Orthodox Jewish adults are most likely to feel comfortable sharing their views on Israel in Jewish settings, followed by Conservative and Reform Jewish adults. Nondenominational and other denomination Jews are the least likely to report being comfortable sharing views about Israel in Jewish settings, with 30% reporting they would be very or somewhat uncomfortable expressing their views about Israel in Jewish settings.
| Comfort in Jewish Spaces | Orthodox | Conservative | Reform | Nondenominational/Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Very uncomfortable | 6% | 4% | 3% | 10% |
| Somewhat uncomfortable | 4% | 7% | 13% | 20% |
| Somewhat comfortable | 15% | 31% | 31% | 33% |
| Very comfortable | 74% | 58% | 52% | 37% |
Those who report that being Jewish is important to them are more likely to feel comfortable expressing their views about Israel compared with Jewish adults for whom being Jewish is less important. More than 90 percent of those who report being Jewish is “a great deal” important to them feel comfortable expressing views about Israel in Jewish spaces, compared with 67% of those who report being Jewish is of “not much” importance and 47% of those for whom being Jewish is not all important in their lives.
| Being Jewish Is Important to Me | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Comfort in Jewish Spaces | Not at All | Not Much | Some | A Great Deal |
| Very uncomfortable | 35% | 15% | 7% | 3% |
| Somewhat uncomfortable | 18% | 18% | 18% | 5% |
| Somewhat comfortable | 18% | 33% | 39% | 22% |
| Very comfortable | 29% | 34% | 37% | 69% |
Comfort expressing views in Jewish spaces is also associated with political identity, as 89% of politically conservative Jewish adults feel comfortable expressing their views about Israel in Jewish spaces compared with 85% of politically moderate and 71% of politically liberal Jewish adults. Differences by political affiliation are particularly pronounced among those who feel very comfortable sharing their views regarding Israel in Jewish spaces, where politically conservative Jews are nearly twice as likely (69%) to feel very comfortable as politically liberal Jews (37%) in expressing their views.
| Comfort in Jewish Spaces | Liberal | Moderate | Conservative |
|---|---|---|---|
| Very uncomfortable | 8% | 7% | 6% |
| Somewhat uncomfortable | 22% | 8% | 4% |
| Somewhat comfortable | 34% | 26% | 20% |
| Very comfortable | 37% | 59% | 69% |
Compared with 10 years ago, about 70% of Jewish adults report that their overall comfort expressing their views regarding Israel has stayed the same. About 20% feel less comfortable compared with 10 years ago, and about 10% feel more comfortable. Change in overall comfort is significantly associated with political affiliation, with liberal Jewish adults reporting becoming more comfortable expressing their views regarding Israel over the past 10 years compared with moderates and conservatives.
| 2023 | |
|---|---|
| Less comfortable | 19% |
| About the same | 70% |
| More comfortable | 11% |
| Total | 100% |
| Liberal | Moderate | Conservative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Less comfortable | 9% | 11% | 14% |
| About the same | 67% | 72% | 72% |
| More comfortable | 14% | 11% | 9% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% |
To capture the impact of October 7, 2023, on the New York Jewish community, we conducted a recontact study in January 2024 with a sample of individuals surveyed in the original 2023 study. The 1,601 responses obtained in the follow-up study enabled a “pre-post” analysis, allowing for the examination of the changes in Israel-related attitudes and feelings among New York Jews in 2024 as well as the extent of changes that have occurred since they were surveyed in 2023.3 We also used this recontact study as an opportunity to ask several new questions related to New Yorkers’ identification with Israel and their views of the Israel-Hamas war.
Overall, we found that the events of October 7 led to increased feelings of attachment to and support for Israel within the New York Jewish community, but these positive feelings toward Israel are not universal. Nondenominational Jewish adults, young adults, and politically liberal Jewish adults more frequently report that their attachment to Israel has weakened after the events of October 7 compared with other groups.
Non-Orthodox adults under 30, in particular, report a material distancing from Israel over the past six months. Over half of this group report that their attachment to Israel became weaker since the start of the war, and only 17% agree that Israel makes them proud to be Jewish in 2024. Additionally, nearly 80% of non-Orthodox adults under 30 do not approve of Israel’s military action in Gaza.
Jewish adults report feeling more attached to Israel in 2024, after the events of October 7, than they did in 2023. The percentage of Jewish adults who report feeling at least somewhat attached to Israel rose from 64% in 2023 to 70% in 2024.
| Attachment to Israel | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Not at all attached | 17% | 14% |
| Not very attached | 19% | 16% |
| Somewhat attached | 33% | 33% |
| Very attached | 31% | 37% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
When asked in January 2024 how their attachment to Israel had changed compared with six months prior, 41% of Jewish adults reported that they felt their attachment to Israel had become stronger while 14% reported that their attachment had weakened. Perceived changes in attachment, however, vary among subgroups and are significantly associated with denomination, age, and political affiliation, as shown in the table below.
| Attachment to Israel | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Became weaker | 14% |
| Stayed the same | 45% |
| Became stronger | 41% |
| Total | 100% |
| Change In Attachment, Compared With Six Months Ago (2024) | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Became Weaker | Stayed the Same | Became Stronger | |
| Denomination | |||
| Orthodox | 5% | 39% | 56% |
| Conservative | 14% | 42% | 44% |
| Reform | 12% | 44% | 45% |
| Nondenominational + other | 20% | 52% | 28% |
| Age | |||
| 18–29 | 32% | 38% | 30% |
| 30–49 | 17% | 43% | 39% |
| 50–64 | 8% | 49% | 43% |
| 65+ | 7% | 50% | 43% |
| Age (Non-Orthodox Only) | |||
| 18–29 | 51% | 28% | 22% |
| 30–49 | 22% | 48% | 30% |
| 50–64 | 10% | 52% | 39% |
| 65+ | 8% | 51% | 42% |
| Political Affiliation | |||
| Liberal | 25% | 48% | 27% |
| Moderate | 6% | 43% | 51% |
| Conservative | 3% | 40% | 57% |
While perceived changes in attachment to Israel do not vary significantly between Jewish adults with a denominational affiliation (of whom most report no change or stronger attachment), nondenominational or other denomination Jewish adults less frequently report that their attachment to Israel has become stronger and more frequently report that their attachment has weakened compared with six months prior.
While politically moderate and conservative Jewish adults mostly report stable or strengthened emotional attachment to Israel over the past six months, politically liberal Jewish adults more frequently report that their attachment to Israel had weakened and less frequently report that their attachment had strengthened. One in four politically liberal Jewish adults report that they feel that their attachment to Israel has weakened compared with six months prior, while just 6% of moderates and 3% of conservatives report weakened attachment.
Those who reported increased attachment to Israel cited the events of October 7 and concerns about Israel’s safety and security as their reasons for strengthening their attachments to Israel. Many noted relationships with friends or family in Israel as reasons for drawing closer to Israel. Some also attributed their increased attachment to recognition of Israel’s role as a Jewish homeland amid concern about antisemitism and anti-Zionism in the world at large.
Those who report decreased attachment to Israel over the previous six months primarily cite the war in Gaza and concerns about genocide as reasons for their weakening attachment to Israel. To a lesser extent, those with decreased attachment also mention the government or political leadership of Israel as a factor in their weakening attachment.
In 2024, Jewish adults report somewhat stronger levels of agreement that Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state compared with 2023. While the proportion of Jewish adults who report that they agree overall that Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state remained flat, the proportion who report that they strongly agree increased from 71% to 77%.
| Level of Agreement | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 8% | 6% |
| Somewhat disagree | 5% | 6% |
| Somewhat agree | 16% | 11% |
| Strongly agree | 71% | 77% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
The extent to which Jewish adults reported following news regarding Israel significantly increased from 2023 to 2024. In 2024, nearly 90% of Jewish adults indicated that they follow news regarding Israel at least somewhat closely, compared with 66% in 2024.
| Level of News Following | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Not at all | 7% | 1% |
| Not too closely | 27% | 10% |
| Somewhat closely | 41% | 39% |
| Very closely | 25% | 50% |
There are no significant differences in Jewish adults’ comfort in expressing their views regarding Israel in Jewish spaces from 2023 to 2024. However, Jewish adults report lower levels of comfort expressing their views regarding Israel in non-Jewish spaces in 2024 compared with 2023. In 2024, 57% of Jewish adults reported that they were at least somewhat comfortable expressing their views regarding Israel in non-Jewish spaces compared with 65% in 2023.
| Level of Comfort | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Very uncomfortable | 10% | 18% |
| Somewhat uncomfortable | 25% | 25% |
| Somewhat comfortable | 39% | 38% |
| Very comfortable | 26% | 19% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
When asked about their perceived change in overall comfort expressing views regarding Israel, 35% of Jewish adults report that they have become less comfortable compared with six months ago. Perceived change in comfort expressing views regarding Israel is significantly associated with age and political affiliation of Jewish adults.
| Level of Comfort | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Less comfortable | 35% |
| About the same | 57% |
| More comfortable | 8% |
| Total | 100% |
Adults age 65+ most frequently report that their comfort expressing views regarding Israel has remained the same compared with six months prior. About one in five Jewish adults age 65+ reported that they have become less comfortable expressing their views compared with 43% of adults aged 50–64 and 46% of adults aged 30–49.
| Level of Comfort, Compared With Six Months Ago (2024) | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Less Comfortable | About the Same | More Comfortable | |
| Age | |||
| 18–29 | 32% | 58% | 10% |
| 30–49 | 46% | 48% | 6% |
| 50–64 | 43% | 49% | 7% |
| 65+ | 21% | 68% | 11% |
| Political Affiliation | |||
| Liberal | 40% | 52% | 8% |
| Moderate | 34% | 59% | 6% |
| Conservative | 22% | 67% | 11% |
While change in overall comfort expressing views regarding Israel does not vary significantly between politically liberal and moderate Jewish adults, both liberal and moderate Jewish adults more frequently report feeling less comfortable expressing their views regarding Israel relative to six months ago compared with politically conservative Jewish adults.
| Reason for Change in Comfort | % of Those with ANY Change in Comfort | % of Those Reporting Less Comfort | % of Those Reporting More Comfort |
|---|---|---|---|
| Avoiding controversy and social risk | 46% | 54% | 9% |
| Opposition to Israeli government or actions | 18% | 18% | 18% |
| Public discourse and misinformation | 15% | 17% | 3% |
| Influence of antisemitism | 14% | 14% | 11% |
| Shift in perspective due to 10/7 and current events | 11% | 9% | 21% |
| Ambivalence or support for both sides | 10% | 12% | * |
| Support for Israel and its defense | 7% | * | 32% |
| Intra-Jewish community tension | 7% | 8% | * |
| Learning more about Israeli history or current events | 3% | * | 10% |
| Other | 2% | * | 9% |
Jewish adults who reported a change in their comfort discussing Israel over the past six months were asked to explain the reason for this shift. Among those who had become less comfortable, the most common reason was a desire to avoid a controversial or polarizing topic (54%) for fear of judgment, relational damage, or even physical harm.
In contrast, among those who had become more comfortable discussing Israel—a smaller group—the top reason was that supporting Israel had become more important to them (32%), with many expressing that speaking up for Israel was their way of contributing to its defense. Many also reported feeling that their perspectives had changed after the events of October 7 (25%) and that they felt compelled to speak out despite or even because of their fear of rising antisemitism (11%).
Notably, one reason was shared across both groups: discomfort with or opposition toward Israel’s actions toward Palestinians or as part of the war in Gaza. Eighteen percent of both those who had grown less comfortable and those who had grown more comfortable cited this as a factor in their changed comfort level.
Change in comfort discussing Israel, in other words, does not neatly predict support for Israel or approval of the current conflict. While a majority of Jewish adults in New York support Israel’s military action (see Attitudes Regarding Israel’s Military Action in Gaza, below), both those who are strongly supportive and strongly opposed to the war report increased comfort at higher rates than those who only somewhat support or oppose Israel’s military action in Gaza, while the greatest decline in comfort is seen among those who somewhat oppose the war.
While most questions on the recontact study were identical to questions asked on the 2023 questionnaire in order to assess change over time, a few questions were added to address the events of October 7 and the war in Gaza. We asked respondents about their approval of Israel’s military actions (as of January 2024) and about the role of pride in Israel as part of their Jewish identity. Finally, two questions at the end of the survey explored Jewish adults’ concerns about the future of Israel and the American Jewish community in the aftermath of October 7.
In light of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, we asked Jewish adults in 2024 if Israel makes them proud to be Jewish. We found that 62% of Jewish adults report that they at least somewhat agree that Israel makes them proud to be Jewish. The extent to which Jewish adults agree that Israel makes them proud to be Jewish varies significantly by denomination, age, and political affiliation.
| 2024 | |
|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 22% |
| Somewhat disagree | 16% |
| Somewhat agree | 23% |
| Strongly agree | 39% |
| Total | 100% |
Older adults are significantly more likely to agree that Israel makes them proud to be Jewish in 2024. Younger individuals, on the other hand, are more likely to disagree: Of all subgroups analyzed in this report, young adults under 30 report the lowest levels of pride in Israel in 2024. This is even more true when excluding Orthodox adults: among non-Orthodox Jewish adults under 30, only 17% agree that Israel makes them proud to be Jewish.
Feelings of pride in Israel are highest among Orthodox and Conservative Jewish adults and lowest among those who do not identify with the three main Jewish denominations (52%). The higher number of Orthodox Jews who disagree that Israel makes them proud to be Jewish, as compared with Conservative and Reform Jews, can be explained by stronger levels of disagreement about Israel among the Haredi segment of the community.
Finally, the share of adults who report that Israel makes them proud to be Jewish is lower among those adults who identify as liberal (48%) than those who are moderate (74%) or conservative (81%).
| Israel Makes Me Proud to Be Jewish (2024) | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Somewhat Agree | Strongly Agree | |
| Denomination | ||||
| Orthodox | 20% | 10% | 17% | 53% |
| Conservative | 15% | 7% | 23% | 55% |
| Reform | 12% | 24% | 23% | 41% |
| Nondenominational + Other | 29% | 19% | 27% | 24% |
| Age | ||||
| 18–29 | 48% | 22% | 14% | 16% |
| 30–49 | 29% | 16% | 21% | 33% |
| 50–64 | 11% | 18% | 25% | 46% |
| 65+ | 9% | 14% | 31% | 47% |
| Political Affiliation | ||||
| Liberal | 34% | 18% | 23% | 25% |
| Moderate | 10% | 16% | 26% | 48% |
| Conservative | 11% | 9% | 22% | 59% |
A little more than two-thirds (68%) of Jewish adults in New York approve of Israel’s military action in Gaza, as of the time of the survey.4 The extent to which Jewish adults approve or disapprove of Israel’s military action in Gaza is significantly associated with denomination, age, and political affiliation.
| Approval | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Strongly disapprove | 19% |
| Somewhat disapprove | 13% |
| Somewhat approve | 24% |
| Strongly approve | 44% |
| Total | 100% |
Support for Israel’s military action is higher among older adults than younger adults. Support for the war is highest among those 65 and older (79%) and lowest among adults under 30 (44%). Support for the war among young people is even lower among the young non-Orthodox: Nearly 80% of non-Orthodox Jews under 30 disapprove of Israel’s military action in Gaza, and over half strongly disapprove of Israel’s military action in Gaza.
Other groups that report lower levels of support for Israel’s military action in Gaza are those who do not identify with one of the three main Jewish denominations (56%) and those who identify as liberal (48%).
| Approval/Disapproval of Military Action in Gaza (2024) | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disapprove | Somewhat Disapprove | Somewhat Approve | Strongly Approve | |
| Denomination | ||||
| Orthodox | 10% | 3% | 16% | 71% |
| Conservative | 16% | 10% | 29% | 45% |
| Reform | 8% | 22% | 26% | 44% |
| Nondenominational/Other | 30% | 14% | 27% | 29% |
| Age | ||||
| 18–29 | 40% | 16% | 18% | 26% |
| 30–49 | 25% | 15% | 25% | 36% |
| 50–64 | 12% | 11% | 25% | 52% |
| 65+ | 9% | 12% | 26% | 53% |
| Political Affiliation | ||||
| Liberal | 33% | 19% | 27% | 21% |
| Moderate | 6% | 10% | 26% | 59% |
| Conservative | 5% | 3% | 15% | 77% |
We asked two future-oriented questions in the recontact study: one that inquired about worry concerning the future of Israel and the other concerning the future of the Jewish community in the U.S. We found that Jewish New Yorkers were substantially worried—almost in equal measure—about the future of both communities. Specifically, 75% of respondents were worried about Israel’s future and 72% were worried about the future of the U.S. Jewish community. Concern about the future of Israel among Jewish adults is associated with age, with younger adults (18–29) expressing the lowest rates of concern (48%) about Israel’s future.
| Israel | U.S. Jewish Community | |
|---|---|---|
| Not at all worried | 10% | 10% |
| Not very worried | 16% | 18% |
| Somewhat worried | 39% | 44% |
| Very worried | 36% | 28% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
| 18–29 | 30–49 | 50–64 | 65+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not at all worried | 19% | 12% | 6% | 5% |
| Not very worried | 33% | 17% | 13% | 8% |
| Somewhat worried | 22% | 40% | 46% | 44% |
| Very worried | 26% | 31% | 35% | 43% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
The most common concern for the future of both U.S. and Israeli Jewry is safety and rising antisemitism. Nearly one-third of Jewish adults (31%) who are worried about either Israel or the U.S. Jewish community cite safety or antisemitism concerns. This share increases to 45% among those who are only worried about the future of the U.S. Jewish community. Concern about Israel’s security and the war troubles about one in seven (14%) who are worried about Israel or the U.S. Jewish community and is the top concern among those who are only worried about Israel (25%). Other leading concerns include political conditions in Israel (9%), public opinion about Israel (8%), and concern about Israel’s conduct in Gaza and/or the morality of the war (8%).
| % of Concern Overall | % of Those Worried ONLY About U.S. Community | % of Those Worried ONLY About Israel | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rising antisemitism / safety concerns | 31% | 45% | 14% |
| Israel's security / impact of war | 14% | * | 25% |
| Israeli political conditions | 9% | 4% | 9% |
| Public opinion about Israel | 8% | * | 9% |
| Israel's actions in Gaza / morality | 8% | 6% | 21% |
| Education / Climate on college campuses | 4% | 6% | 4% |
| U.S. political conditions | 4% | 5% | 2% |
| Jewish identity / assimilation | 3% | 3% | 1% |
| Divisions among Jews | 3% | 5% | * |
| Loss of U.S. support for Israel | 3% | * | * |
| Other | 17% | 14% | 10% |